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The year 2002 will go down as a dark year in corporate history, 
as scandals involving misleading financial reporting designed to 
inflate earnings and hide losses engulfed companies such as Enron, 
WorldCom, Global Crossing, Tyco, and others.1  Not surprisingly, 
this corporate meltdown has prompted a wealth of commentary 
laying the blame on a variety of doorsteps.  These include: 
decreased enforcement of securities laws due to a combination of 
legislative barriers to private lawsuits;2 a lack of resources for the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), coupled with 
rulings limiting the liability of indirect participants in securities 
fraud;3 the replacement of professionalism with a business-
 
†   Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. 
 1. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy 
Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003) 
(providing an overview of these scandals). 
 2. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the “Expectations Gap” in Investor 
Protection: The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1161-63 
(2003). 
 3. Id. at 1141, 1159-61. 
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generating ethos among the partners of major accounting firms;4 
pressure on securities analysts to make favorable statements about 
companies in order to promote investment banking business for 
the firms employing the analysts;5 unintended consequences of the 
increasing tendency to tie management compensation to stock 
performance;6 lack of independence of directors on the board of 
Enron and other companies;7 inadequacies in the regulation of 
derivatives;8 and the irrational behavior of investors themselves.9 
To this list of whom to blame, I would like to add my own pet 
villain, which, I suggest, played at least a non-trivial role in sowing 
the seeds for these scandals.  My villain is the much noted New 
York trial court decision in Kamin v. American Express Co.10  In this 
decision, the court held that it was entirely appropriate, under a 
doctrine known as the business judgment rule, for the directors of 
American Express to cause the company to lose millions of dollars 
for the sole purpose of improving reported earnings and thereby 
maintaining the price at which the company’s stock traded.11  
Having given such a carte blanche for the practice now referred to 
as earnings management,12 it is not surprising that eventually there 
would be a cascade of scandals that, at its core, involves 
corporations engaging in transactions lacking real substance and 
designed simply to improve reported earnings. 
 
 4. See, e.g., Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of 
Commodification, Independence, and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. 
REV. 1167, 1168 (2003). 
 5. See, e.g., Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 145-46 (2002). 
 6. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and 
Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1233, 1246-47 (2002). 
 7. See Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and 
Corporate Governance Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 871-74 (2003). 
 8. See Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of “May,” 
48 VILL. L. REV. 1245, 1262-80 (2003). 
 9. See John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron?: A Capsule Social and Economic 
History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2004). 
 10. 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1976). 
 11. Id. at 812. 
 12. See generally Gregory S. Rowland, Note, Earnings Management, the SEC, and 
Corporate Governance: Director Liability Arising from the Audit Committee Report, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 168, 207 n.5 (2002) (defining “earnings management”). 
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I. THE KAMIN CASE 
A.  An Overview 
Normally, one should be leery of attaching too much 
significance to just one New York trial court decision affirmed by 
an intermediate appellate court without a written opinion.  
Nevertheless, for a substantial fraction of the current generation of 
corporate attorneys, the New York trial court’s decision in Kamin 
forms part of their essential understanding of the duties of 
corporate directors, if, for no other reason, than because of the 
opinion’s inclusion in many of the leading casebooks used to teach 
the subject.13 
Kamin involved a shareholders’ derivative complaint against 
the directors of American Express Co. who had approved 
distributing an in-kind dividend.  This dividend consisted of shares 
of stock in another company (Donaldson, Lufken & Jenrette 
(“DLJ”)), which American Express had purchased some years 
before as an investment and which had declined substantially in 
value.14  The plaintiffs contended the directors should have sold the 
DLJ shares at a loss rather than distributing them to the American 
Express stockholders.15  In this manner, American Express could 
have obtained a capital loss deduction that would have saved 
American Express around $8 million in taxes.16 
 
 13. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 536 (8th ed. unabridged 2000); WILLIAM A. 
KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, 
PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 316 (5th ed. 2003); JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL., 
CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY: MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 284 (5th ed. 2003); JESSE 
H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 198 (5th ed. 2000). 
 14. Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 809.  American Express had acquired the DLJ 
stock for almost $30 million, and the stock was only worth $4 million when 
distributed.  Id. 
 15. Id. at 809-10. 
 16. Id. at 811.  From a tax planning standpoint, the board’s decision made no 
sense.  By selling the DLJ stock, American Express evidently could have recognized 
a loss of around $25 million.  Id.  Given the apparent size and nature of American 
Express’s other income, and the applicable marginal tax rates, reduction in 
American Express’s taxable income by recognizing this loss would have lowered 
the company’s tax bill by $8 million.  Id.  By contrast, with the in-kind dividend, 
not only was American Express not able to recognize the $25 million loss on its tax 
return, its shareholders received a basis (the sum used in computing gain or loss 
for tax purposes on the disposition of property) equal to no more than the 
current fair market value of the DLJ stock at the time the shareholders received 
the dividend, rather than equal to the higher amount paid by American Express 
3
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The board’s rationale for the in-kind dividend lay in the 
accounting treatment of the transaction.17  This treatment 
(although there was some dispute about this) paralleled the tax 
treatment.  Just as distributing the stock as an in-kind dividend, 
rather than selling the shares, avoided recognizing a loss that would 
have reduced American Express’s taxable income, it also avoided 
recognizing a loss that would have lowered the income reported in 
the corporation’s published financial statements.18  Faced with a 
transaction that cost the corporation $8 million, all for the purpose 
of avoiding reporting a loss in the company’s published financial 
statements, the court granted the defendants’ motions in the 
alternative to dismiss the complaint as not stating a cause of action 
or for summary judgment.19 
B.  Kamin and the Outer Bounds of the Business Judgment Rule 
One reason for Kamin’s prominence in corporate law 
casebooks is because of its illustration of a rather extreme view of a 
doctrine known as the business judgment rule.  Different courts 
define the business judgment rule differently.20  To some courts, 
the so-called rule is simply an overly dramatic way of stating that 
directors of a corporation are not liable for decisions the directors 
make which go awry, unless the directors breached their duties of 
loyalty or care, and that bad results do not, in themselves, show a 
breach of the duty of care (negligence).21  To most courts, however, 
 
for the DLJ stock.  Id.; see 26 U.S.C. § 301(d) (2004).  Hence, the dividend 
destroyed the potential for anyone (including American Express’s shareholders) 
to obtain the loss deduction on the DLJ stock’s pre-distribution decline in value.  
Moreover, the American Express shareholders still had to recognize the dividend 
as income, just as they would have had they received cash proceeds from the sale 
of the DLJ shares by American Express (e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 301 (2004)) since there is 
no indication that American Express owned enough shares in DLJ for a tax-free 
spin-off (e.g., 26 U.S.C § 355(a)(1)(A) (2004)).  Further, even if the American 
Express shareholders had received the DLJ stock in a tax free spin-off, American 
Express’s tax savings on recognizing the loss would have far exceeded the total tax 
paid by American Express’s shareholders on receiving a $4 million cash dividend 
instead of $4 million worth of stock in a tax-free spin-off. 
 17. Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 809. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 815. 
 20. See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless 
Verbiage or Misguided Notion? 67 S. CALIF. L. REV. 287, 290-303 (1994). 
 21. See, e.g., Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 667, 678 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).  “In 
other words, directors are liable for negligence in the performance of their duties.  
Not being insurers, directors are not liable for errors of judgment or for mistakes 
4
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the business judgment rule has greater significance.  It serves to 
insulate the directors from liability for ordinary negligence in 
making business decisions, so long as the directors are not in a 
conflict of interest in making the decisions.  For example, in 
Delaware, directors are not liable for a business decision (so long as 
the decision does not involve a conflict of interest) unless they 
made the decision in bad faith or with gross negligence.22  
Alternatively, other courts have interpreted the rule as limiting the 
courts’ ability to review the substantive reasonableness of the 
directors’ decision (as opposed to the process by which the board 
reached the decision).23  At the extreme, some courts view the 
business judgment rule as placing beyond challenge pretty much 
any decision made by directors without a conflict of interest, no 
matter how ill-conceived the decision, so long as the directors 
thought their action was somehow in the best interest of the 
corporation.24  Language in the Kamin opinion places this decision 
in this extreme camp.25 
Although Kamin takes an extreme view of what a complaining 
shareholder must allege in order to hold directors liable, it would 
be a mistake to read the opinion as placing any disinterested board 
decision beyond judicial review.  To understand what limits remain 
on directors’ decisions even under Kamin, it is helpful to try to 
reconcile the opinion with two previous New York trial court 
decisions also involving the business judgment rule. 
Litwin v. Allen,26 while merely another New York trial court 
 
while acting with reasonable skill and prudence.”  Id. 
 22. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). 
 23. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 996 (N.Y. 1979); see also 
JONATHAN R. MACEY, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c) (1998). 
 24. See Schlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
 25. Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), 
aff’d, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976). 
Section 720(a)(1)(A) of the Business Corporation Law permits an 
action against directors for “[t]he neglect of, or failure to perform, or 
other violation of his duties in the management and disposition of 
corporate assets committed to his charge.”  This does not mean that a 
director is chargeable with ordinary negligence for having made an 
improper decision, or having acted imprudently.  The “neglect” 
referred to in the statute is neglect of duties (i.e., malfeasance or 
nonfeasance) and not misjudgment.  To allege that a director 
“negligently permitted the declaration and payment” of a dividend 
without alleging fraud, dishonesty or nonfeasance, is to state merely 
that a decision was taken with which one disagrees. 
Id. 
 26. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940). 
5
Gevurtz: Earnings Management and the Business Judgment Rule: An Essay on R
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
GEVURTZ - READY.DOC 5/20/2004  7:40 PM 
1266 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:4 
decision, helped form the understanding of the duties of directors 
for an earlier generation of corporate attorneys.  In its language, 
the opinion in Litwin stands at the opposite extreme from Kamin as 
far as the meaning of the business judgment rule.  Litwin employs 
language that suggests that directors, like anyone else charged with 
breaching the duty of care, will be liable for ordinary negligence.27  
As later readers of the Litwin case have pointed out, however, the 
actual facts of the case involve more than simple negligence.28  In 
Litwin, the court held the directors of Guaranty Trust Company 
liable for their decision to purchase $3 million of debentures.29  
The problem, as the court saw it, was not just that the debentures 
declined in value, causing Guaranty Trust to incur a loss.  Rather, 
the problem with the directors’ action was that the purchase 
agreement gave the seller the option to repurchase the debentures 
at the sale price within six months.30  This meant that while 
Guaranty Trust faced the risk of loss if the debentures declined in 
value, Guaranty Trust did not obtain the corresponding potential 
for gain since, if the debentures appreciated, the seller presumably 
could exercise its option to repurchase.  In other words, the 
directors had placed the corporation in an entirely no-win situation 
in which, at best, the company would break even and, at worst, it 
would suffer serious losses.  This goes beyond incurring an 
unreasonable risk of suffering a loss in order to seek some sort of 
corporate gain. 
In Gottfried v. Gottfried,31 as with Kamin, a New York trial court 
confronted a challenge to the decisions of directors with respect to 
the declaration of dividends.32  In Gottfried, however, the 
shareholders’ complaint was about the directors’ refusal to declare 
dividends.33  Gottfried arose out of animosity between the 
shareholders of a closely held corporation—the Gottfried Baking 
 
 27. Id. at 699.  “There is more here than a question of business judgment as 
to which men might well differ.  The directors plainly failed in this instance to 
bestow the care which the situation demanded.  Unless we are to do away entirely 
with the doctrine that directors of a bank are liable for negligence in 
administering its affairs liability should be imposed in connection with this 
transaction.”  Id. 
 28. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting the corporate 
decision in Litwin was “so egregious as to amount to a no-win decision”). 
 29. 25 N.Y.S.2d at 691, 700. 
 30. Id. at 700-01. 
 31. 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1947). 
 32. Id. at 693-94. 
 33. Id. 
6
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Corporation.34  The shareholders were the children of the founder 
of the company and their spouses.35  The minority faction sued the 
directors to compel an increase in the dividends.36  Through the 
Depression, the company had not declared dividends on the 
common stock; but with improved prospects at the end of the 
Second World War, the minority shareholders claimed that the 
majority had refused to declare dividends for the purpose of 
starving out the minority so that the minority would sell their 
shares.37  The court held that it would uphold the directors’ 
decision with respect to the amount of dividends, absent a showing 
that the directors acted in bad faith rather than for the 
corporation’s welfare.38  Finding insufficient evidence of such bad 
faith, the court granted a judgment for the defendants.39 
The evident way to reconcile Litwin, Gottfried, and Kamin is to 
say that a challenged action by a corporate board of directors, at 
the very least, must have for its subjective goal advancing the 
interests of the corporation or the shareholders.  Under Kamin’s 
view, the court will not balance this goal against the cost of the 
action to the corporation, as a court might do in a traditional tort 
case.40  Nevertheless, costing the corporation millions of dollars 
must have some arguable utility; otherwise, it would be the 
equivalent of Litwin’s no-win situation and suggestive of bad faith, 
as the court warned against in Gottfried.  This meant that the court 
in Kamin had to find some rationale for the directors’ action. 
C.  Kamin As a Green Light for Earnings Management  
The rationale for the directors’ action that the court accepted 
in Kamin was to avoid reporting a loss in American Express’ 
published financial statements on American Express’ investment in 
the DLJ stock, which, in turn, would have lowered the net earnings 
reported by American Express to the investing public.41  Such a 
report of lower earnings, the court reasoned, could lower the price 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 694. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 695. 
 39. Id. at 701. 
 40. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) 
(laying out a formula to balance the burden of avoiding liability with the gravity 
and likelihood of the resulting harm). 
 41. Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 811. 
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at which American Express stock traded on the market, and hence 
would be bad for the American Express shareholders.42  In other 
words, not only was there nothing wrong with seeking to maintain 
stock prices by hiding a loss, according to the court in Kamin, this 
goal justified giving up $8 million in tax savings. 
Rather than question this goal, the plaintiffs in Kamin made 
two arguments.  The first was that proper accounting, according to 
the plaintiffs’ accounting experts, required American Express to 
recognize the loss, even though American Express distributed, 
rather than sold, the DLJ stock.43  The trial court cast this argument 
aside, noting that the defendants’ accounting experts disagreed 
with the position of the plaintiffs’ experts.44  In addition, the trial 
court pointed out that after the chief accountant of the SEC raised 
some questions about the appropriate accounting treatment of the 
transaction, the SEC did not pursue the matter.45  The plaintiffs’ 
second argument was that four of American Express’s twenty 
directors had a conflict of interest in voting for the dividend 
because these four directors were officers and employees of 
American Express covered by the company’s Executive Incentive 
Compensation Plan.46  As such, some of the compensation of these 
four directors depended upon the level of reported earnings.  
Finding no showing that the four insiders had dominated or 
controlled the sixteen outside directors, the trial court also rejected 
this argument.47 
Looking back now, it is interesting how the two arguments of 
the plaintiffs in Kamin foreshadowed the scandals of 2002.  The 
conflicting views of the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ accounting 
experts, and the raised eyebrows (even if no ultimate action) by the 
SEC, suggest that American Express was pursuing an accounting 
treatment at the borderline of what was acceptable.  Coupled with 
this aggressive accounting approach was a compensation scheme 
that gave management an incentive to report higher earnings.  In 
Enron and the other scandals of 2002, corporations pushed the 
limits of acceptable accounting48 in search of higher reported 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 812. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Rowland, supra note 12, at 9-14 n.5; Anthony H. Catanach, Jr. & 
Shelley Rhoades-Catanach, Enron: A Financial Reporting Failure?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 
8
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earnings and higher stock prices that benefited management, 
much of whose compensation was in the form of stock options and 
the like.49  The plaintiffs’ attorneys in Kamin, however, may have 
lost the forest in the trees.  The plaintiffs’ attorneys could have 
used American Express’ abandonment of $8 million in tax savings 
as an opportunity to question the very goal of seeking to hide losses 
and maintain higher stock prices, regardless of what accounting 
practice allowed.  Instead, by retaining experts to discuss the 
appropriate accounting treatment, the plaintiffs implicitly 
conceded the legitimacy of the goal. 
II. RETHINKING KAMIN’S UNDERLYING PREMISES 
ABOUT EARNING MANAGEMENT 
A.  The Efficient Markets Critique  
A common critique of Kamin from law professors over the last 
couple of decades is that the directors’ action was simply futile.50  In 
a sense, the directors’ action is like the ostrich that sticks its head in 
the sand to pretend there is no danger.  After all, the plaintiffs in 
Kamin knew about the loss American Express suffered on the 
investment in the DLJ stock—otherwise, they would not have filed 
the complaint.  Since there is no indication that the plaintiffs had 
any special access to inside information, it is unlikely that avoiding 
recognizing the loss in American Express’s financial statements 
kept the loss a secret.  Accordingly, one might argue that the 
directors’ action could have no positive effect on the price of 
American Express shares (thereby suggesting the plaintiffs may 
have been correct in their innuendo that the real objective was to 
maintain reported earnings in order for management to receive 
extra compensation). 
This critique is a subset of the efficient capital markets 
thinking that swept up law professors in the 1980s and 1990s.  
During the last two decades, legal scholarship increasingly has 
invoked the so-called Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis51—which 
 
1057 (2003). 
 49. See Gordon, supra note 6. 
 50. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., TEACHER’S MANUAL TO BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 
207-08 (5th ed. 2003). 
 51. See, e.g., Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). 
9
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is a fancy way of saying that stock prices in active trading markets 
move very rapidly in response to information relevant to a stock, 
and, thus, the stock’s price will incorporate the information in very 
short order.  One key question about the Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis is what types of information it covers.  Here, the 
hypothesis breaks down into three flavors.  The weak form states 
that the price incorporates all information one can glean from 
looking at past price movements.  The semi-strong form holds that 
the price incorporates all publicly available information.  The 
strong form of the hypothesis holds that the market price 
incorporates all information, including information not supposed 
to be known outside the corporation.52 
Needless to say, the scandals involving Enron and the like have 
cast something of a damper on this view of the world.  After all, not 
only did the market price of Enron stock fail to impound non-
public information about the company’s true state (contrary to the 
prediction of the strong version of the Efficient Capital Markets 
Hypothesis), the price failed to impound all of the publicly 
available warnings about the quality of Enron’s reported earnings.53  
As a result, the Enron experience undermines even the semi-strong 
version of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis.  What this 
means is that the professed belief of the directors and the court in 
Kamin that the stock dividend really could hide the loss from the 
market and maintain the price of American Express shares may not 
have been as naive as law professors have suggested.54 
B.  The Legitimacy of Seeking Higher Stock Prices Through Earnings 
Management  
The main problem with Kamin, as brought home by the 
corporate scandals of 2002, is both the court’s and the litigants’ 
unqualified assumption that reporting higher earnings to maintain 
the trading price of American Express stock was a legitimate goal 
for corporate directors.  The only issue under this view is whether 
 
 52. See, e.g., R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 290-310 
(4th ed. 1993). 
 53. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 6, at 1235-40. 
 54. This is not to say that the stock dividend prevented the unreported loss 
on the DLJ stock from having any impact at all on the price of American Express 
shares.  Some market participants presumably adjusted their evaluation of 
American Express to reflect their knowledge of the loss.  The question is whether 
the impact would have been greater had the loss shown up in the financial 
statements. 
10
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the directors had slipped the bounds of acceptable accounting 
practice as a means toward achieving this goal.  Even before the 
scandals of 2002, some writers had questioned whether the goal of 
hiding losses, itself, was legitimate.55 
One likely reason for the Kamin court’s unquestioning 
acceptance of the goal of higher share prices through higher 
reported earnings is this goal’s proximity to two almost universally 
accepted goals for corporate directors: maximizing profits for the 
corporation56 and maximizing the price at which shareholders are 
able to sell their stock.57  The corporate scandals of 2002 
demonstrate, however, that there can be a significant difference 
between maximizing the reported earnings and maximizing the 
real earnings of a corporation.  Moreover, it turns out that once we 
start examining the goal of maximizing the price at which 
shareholders are able to sell their stock, this objective becomes 
much more problematic than typically assumed. 
To begin with, there are obviously two parties involved in a 
stock trade: the seller, for whom high prices are good, and the 
buyer, for whom high prices are not so good.  As the board seeks 
higher prices for selling shareholders (who will soon not be part of 
the corporation),58 one could certainly ask whether the board owes 
any duty to the buyers (or prospective shareholders, who, upon 
their purchase, will become part of the corporation).  In fact, there 
is authority suggesting that directors have a fiduciary duty toward 
prospective shareholders, particularly when it comes to information 
impacting the purchase of stock.  For example, insider-trading 
cases hold that directors and other corporate insiders have a duty 
to disclose non-public material information when selling their 
shares to parties who are not yet shareholders.59  Admittedly, this 
disclosure duty only applies if the directors or insiders are the 
persons selling their shares (since the obligation is to disclose or 
else abstain from trading);60 yet, underlying this duty is the notion 
that directors stand in a fiduciary relationship with prospective, and 
 
 55. See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 4.1.2(c) n.31 (2000). 
 56. See, e.g., AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01(a) 
(1994). 
 57. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
 58. Using the term in the sense of a collective group, rather than a separate 
legal entity.  See, e.g., ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE § 69 (1976). 
 59. See, e.g., Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951). 
 60. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980). 
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not just current, shareholders.61  What this means is that any gains 
the board achieves for selling shareholders, at the expense of the 
buyers who thereby become shareholders, represents a wash as far 
as the interests of the parties toward whom the board owes a 
fiduciary duty.  Hence, all other factors being equal, the gains for 
selling shareholders cannot, under the reasoning in Litwin, justify 
imposing a cost upon the corporation.62 
In any event, the facts of Kamin force us to recognize that 
there is also the interest of the stockholders who are not selling.  
On a superficial level, even shareholders who lack immediate plans 
to sell typically seem happier when the price of their shares is 
higher rather than lower.  On the other hand, it is an interesting 
question as to whether shareholders without plans to sell would be 
happier with higher share prices if they knew it was the product of 
hiding losses (as in Kamin) or of other forms of earnings 
management.  In order to keep this essay manageable, let us ignore 
considerations of real world preferences discovered by studies of 
behavioral psychology in the economics field,63 and ask what would 
make sense from the standpoint of non-selling shareholders. 
A recent paper by a trio of business professors argues that 
earnings management might be in the economic interest of the 
existing shareholders.64  The thesis is that earnings management 
can prevent inefficient meddling by owners in decisions better left 
to managers.  Specifically, without earnings management, owners 
might overreact to short-term poor performance.  Fear of such 
overreaction, in turn, could lead to suboptimal decisions by 
managers who might, for example, forgo potentially better 
 
 61. Id. at n.8 (basing the duty to disclose or abstain on a fiduciary relationship 
between parties to the trade, and applying this concept to insiders selling to 
purchasers who thereby will become shareholders). 
 62. There is no conflict between this conclusion and the repeated judicial 
holdings imposing a duty on directors to seek the highest price for selling 
shareholders in transactions involving sale of control.  See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).  In these cases, 
the buyer has an advantage over the selling shareholders who face a collective 
action problem in negotiating for the highest price.  Hence, the board’s 
intervention is appropriate to level the playing field between the purchaser and 
the selling shareholders, even if the intervention imposes a cost on the 
corporation. 
 63. See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2000). 
 64. ANIL ARYA ET AL., ARE UNMANAGED EARNINGS ALWAYS BETTER FOR 
SHAREHOLDERS? (Yale ICF, Working Paper No. 02-37, Aug. 2002), at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=322260 (last visited Apr. 19, 
2004). 
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investment decisions in favor of decisions that assure at least 
acceptable short-term results.  This is an interesting theory.  Yet, 
reality seems very different.  In contrast to the well-documented 
antics of the owner of the New York Yankees baseball team,65 it is 
difficult to find much empirical evidence that owners (or directors) 
of publicly held corporations are quick to interfere with managers 
whenever such corporations report poor earnings results.66 
In contrast to its uncertain advantages, using earnings 
management to maintain higher share prices might produce a 
couple of concrete disadvantages to non-selling shareholders.  
Kamin illustrates the first obvious disadvantage.  The corporation 
 
 65. See Trouble in Paradise as Torre, Steinbrenner Fight, WICHITA EAGLE, Apr. 22, 
2003, at 3D. 
 66. Indeed, it has been well accepted in corporate law literature since the 
classic work by Professors Berle and Means (ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. 
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)) that 
shareholders in the publicly held corporation are “rationally apathetic” and will 
not interfere with management.  See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 55, at 230, § 3.1.5.a.  
Moreover, despite some relatively recent instances of boards sacking 
underperforming CEOs, as a general proposition directors also have been slow to 
second-guess management based upon short-term poor results. See, e.g., id.; see also 
The Way We Govern Now, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2003, at 59 (discussing poor 
board governance in light of corporate scandals involving Enron); MICHAEL C. 
JENSEN & JOSEPH FULLER, WHAT’S A DIRECTOR TO DO? (Harv. NOM, Working Paper 
No. 02-38, Oct. 2002), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=357722 (last visited Apr. 19, 2004) (“The recent wave of corporate scandals 
provides continuing evidence that boards have failed to fulfill their role as the top-
level corporate control mechanism.”).  Of course, poor earnings and poor market 
performance might endanger management by making the corporation a target for 
a hostile takeover.  See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the 
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 265-66 (1977).  Yet, takeover 
defenses, such as poison pills and staggered boards, increasingly have blunted this 
threat.  See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered 
Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 889 (2002).  Moreover, it 
seems that takeovers result from a sustained period of poor earnings and poor 
market performance rather than the sort of short-term poor performance 
addressed by Professors Arya, Clover and Sunder.  Arya, supra note 64. Cf., Melvin 
A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1497-98 
(1989) (noting that large effects on stock price are necessary to trigger a takeover 
because of the substantial premiums involved). 
Higher share prices might provide a second possible benefit to non-selling 
shareholders if the shareholders use their stock as collateral for loans.  This 
benefit can dissipate, however, if share prices decline in the future (which, as 
discussed below, is a danger with earnings management).  In this event, the loan 
agreement might require the posting of additional security, as can occur when a 
decline in stock prices produces a margin call on stock used as collateral for a loan 
used to finance the purchase of stock.  See 12 C.F.R. §§ 221.3, 221.8 (limiting 
borrowing to buy stock on margin to a percentage of the value of the stock 
securing the loan). 
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may end up paying more taxes as a result of seeking higher 
reported earnings.  Admittedly, corporations often are able to 
avoid this disadvantage insofar as the law allows inconsistent 
accounting treatment in tax returns and public financial 
reporting.67  Nevertheless, a recent study of firms that restated their 
publicly reported income during the years 1996 to 2002 found 
these companies paid more than $300 million in taxes on income 
they subsequently conceded they did not make.68 
A second disadvantage for the non-selling shareholders from 
earnings management is the danger that the corporation may face 
liability for securities fraud.  As noted by Judge Friendly, corporate 
liability in securities fraud lawsuits effectively means taking money 
from the existing shareholders of the corporation to pay injured 
traders.69  Of course, the court in Kamin did not hold that the 
business judgment rule would protect directors whose efforts at 
earnings management reached the point of constituting a knowing 
misrepresentation of material fact.  Yet to suggest, as seems to be 
the bottom line in Kamin, that the business judgment rule protects 
all efforts to manipulate accounting in order to report the largest 
possible earnings so long as the SEC does not find fraud, 
underestimates the danger of such a regime from the standpoint of 
the interest of non-selling shareholders.  The problem is that 
earnings management often operates in a gray area between 
straightforward reporting and outright fraud.70  Operating in this 
gray area creates the risk that the corporation will incur liability if 
the corporate officials misjudge what a finder of fact later decides 
was acceptable, or, even without an adjudication of liability, the risk 
that the corporation will incur the costs of litigation and possibly 
settlement.71 
 
 67. See George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a 
Lesson from History, 54 SMU L. REV. 209 (2001). 
 68. Merle Erickson et al., How Much Will Firms Pay for Earnings that Do Not 
Exist? Evidence of Taxes Paid on Allegedly Fraudulent Earnings (Oct. 2002), at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=347420 (last visited Apr. 19, 
2004). 
 69. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(Friendly, J., concurring). 
 70. See Rowland, supra note 12, at 169 n.5 (internal quotations omitted). 
 71. Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act passed by Congress in 1995 
make it easier for corporations to avoid lengthy litigation of securities fraud claims 
when the merits are uncertain, most particularly by imposing heightened pleading 
requirements.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2004); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999) (dismissing a fraud class-action claim for 
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Since almost all shareholders sell eventually, it is also 
appropriate to consider the impact of earnings management upon 
shareholders who sell a significant time after the corporation has 
reported higher “managed” earnings.  Earnings management often 
has a sort of “robbing-Peter-to-pay-Paul” effect as far as future 
earnings reports.  So, to use a simple example, the crude earnings 
management technique of seeking at the end of an accounting 
period to delay expenses and accelerate receipts72 so as to show 
higher reported income for the period (be it a year or a quarter), 
means less income and more expense reported for the next 
period—presumably to the detriment of shareholders who sell after 
the next period.  Indeed, this “robbing-Peter-to-pay-Paul” aspect of 
earnings management can create a snowball effect, as illustrated by 
the recent corporate scandals.  Unless real earnings substantially 
increase, management must use ever more aggressive earnings 
management techniques just to pull reported earnings out of the 
hole dug by the prior use of earnings management, not to mention 
meeting market demands for reporting ever-increasing earnings.73  
The end result in companies like Enron and WorldCom was a 
collapse of stock prices to the detriment of stockholders who had 
held their shares and sought to sell too late.74 
 
defective and insufficient pleadings).  This, however, does not eliminate all threat 
of suit.  See EP Medsystems, Inc. v. EchoCath, Inc., 235 F.3d 865 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(upholding complaint under Rule 10b-5 as meeting the heightened pleading 
standard). 
 72. Managers might accelerate receipts by adopting sales incentives that 
encourage their customers to move forward purchases that the customers will 
make anyway (so-called “channel stuffing”).  See ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE 
STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA DON’T WANT YOU TO KNOW 
163 (2002). 
 73. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 1, at 933-34. 
 74. See Robert Frank et al., Scandal Scorecard, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at B1 
(detailing stock price declines at Enron and other corporations involved in 
scandals of 2002). 
This discussion of earnings management is oversimplified insofar as it presupposes 
the use of earnings management always to report the highest possible income for 
any given accounting period—which creates the “robbing-Peter-to-pay-Paul” 
problem of simply putting off the Day of Judgment.  By contrast, in the technique 
referred to as a “big bath,” management reports a major one-time loss, instead of 
gradually reporting increased expenses spread over a period of time in the future.  
Id.  The notion is that investors will ignore one-time losses as aberrational.  See 
Rowland, supra note 12, at 172 n.14.  (Interestingly, this view of investor 
psychology is quite different than taken by the directors and the court in Kamin).  
Moreover, up until the market of the 1990s, it appeared that corporate officials 
often used earnings management to level out reported income.  In other words, 
corporate officials manipulated accounting to avoid overly good showings in fat 
15
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All told, the court in Kamin was mistaken in its assumption that 
the interests of American Express’s shareholders justified 
transactions designed solely to maximize reported earnings.  The 
interests of trading shareholders (buyers and sellers) wash out, and 
maximizing reported (rather than real) earnings does not 
generally further the interests of non-trading shareholders.75  This 
 
years, as well as to improve reported earnings in lean years.  See Coffee, supra note 
9, at 11.  For example, a corporation might lower reported earnings during a 
particularly good quarter by charging, as an added expense, increased funding of 
so-called “cookie-cutter reserves.”  The corporation then could reduce such 
reserves in order to improve net income reported in a poor quarter.  See Rowland, 
supra note 12, at 172 n.14. 
A full exploration of the impact of these sorts of techniques on the interests of 
shareholders is getting a bit beyond the scope of this short essay.  To begin with, 
the impact is subtler than with earnings management that simply seeks to 
maximize reported earnings.  For instance, smoothing reported earnings might 
improve share prices over the long term because investors discount the price they 
are willing to pay depending on the volatility of earnings.  (Greater volatility 
means greater risk, which, in turn, leads rational investors to demand a greater 
return.  See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 570-71 (3d ed. 2001)).  
Moreover, managers might argue that there is no inherent reason why smoothing 
of reported earnings, and resulting higher share prices, cannot continue 
indefinitely.  The danger, however, arises from the fact that investors are looking 
at past earnings volatility in order to gauge future risk.  So long as future earnings 
volatility (as massaged through earnings management) does not exceed the past, 
there is no harm, just as there is no harm to going without fire insurance so long 
as there is no fire.  The comeuppance occurs if the corporation suffers a 
particularly bad period of earnings.  In this event, the stock price presumably will 
go down, not only to reflect the decreased earnings, but also to reflect a 
reassessment of the riskiness of holding the stock.  This decrease in price obviously 
harms purchasers who overpaid because earnings management caused them to 
underestimate the riskiness of the stock.  Moreover, having been burned, investors 
might further discount the stock to reflect the risk that, due to earnings 
management, they still are misjudging the risk. 
Returning our focus to Kamin, however, the green light given to earnings 
management by the court seems to ignore any distinction between smoothing 
earnings and seeking to maximize earnings.  Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 815.  In fact, 
because of the one-time nature of the loss suffered by American Express on the 
DLJ stock, the goal of maximizing reported earnings may have coincided with the 
goal of smoothing out fluctuations in reported earnings.  Yet, the court never 
draws any attention either to this fact or to its implications as far as permissible 
earnings management.  Id.  In any event, the corporate scandals of 2002 seem to 
have been symptomatic of a shift in the use of earnings management from a device 
to smooth out reported income, to a device to show ever-growing income.  See 
Coffee, supra note 9, at 11. 
 75. For a different analysis of whether earnings management is in the 
interests of shareholders (focusing on the investment strategies of so-called “right 
side” and “left side” shareholders, and finding that earnings management is never 
in the interest of “right side” shareholders and not in the ultimate interest of “left 
side” shareholders)  see William Bratton, Shareholder Value, Financial Conservatism, 
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does not mean that every accounting choice that results in higher 
reported earnings than another choice breaches the directors’ 
duty.  If the choice does not impose a significant cost on the 
corporation (such as the $8 million of tax savings lost in Kamin), 
then the choice represents a functional nil set.  This analysis does 
mean, however, that the desire simply to report (rather than to 
achieve) higher earnings cannot justify incurring significant costs 
for the corporation. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this essay is not to argue that shareholder 
derivative lawsuits asserting state law fiduciary duty claims are the 
answer to earnings management.  Kamin was a fairly rare case in 
that the directors’ efforts to pump up reported earnings entailed 
an immediate, large, and concrete cost upon the corporation.  This 
substantial negative impact upon the corporation, in turn, forced 
the directors to be candid about their motive and confronted the 
court with the need to assess the legitimacy of the directors’ goal.  
The significance of the court’s acceptance of the directors’ goal lay 
not in closing off future state law shareholders’ derivative claims, 
since earnings management normally will not impose the sort of 
cost upon the corporation that would prompt a state law 
shareholder derivative lawsuit.  Rather, the significance of the 
decision in Kamin was the unfortunate message that it sent to 
future corporate management and their attorneys.  To the extent 
that judicial pronouncements have an impact independent of 
creating or precluding liability because of the norms such 
pronouncements establish,76 then the court’s decision in Kamin can 
take some responsibility for the corporate scandals of 2002. 
 
 
and Auditor Independence (Oct. 10, 2003), at http://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=454080 (last visited Apr. 19, 2004). 
 76. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness and the 
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1793-95 (2001). 
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